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I.
By first-order discrimination, Imean what we
ordinarily understand by the term "discrimination" in
political contexts: A manifest attitude in which a
particular attribute of a person that is irrelevant to
judgments of that person's intrinsic value or
competence, e.g. her race, gender, class, sexual
orientation, or religious or ethnic affIliation, is seen as
a source of disvalue or incompetence; in general, as a
source of inferiority.2 I shall call an attribute so
perceived a primary disvalued attribute, and a person
perceived as bearing such an attribute the disvaluee.
Conversely, I shall call any such arbitrary attribute,
when seen as a source of value or superiority, a
primary valued attribute, and a person perceived as
bearing such an attribute the valuee. By second-order
discrimination, Iwill understand the attitude within
which a primary disvalued or valued attribute in turn
confers disvalue or value respectively on further
attributes of the disvaluee or valuee respectively. I
shall refer to these latter as secondary disvalued (or
valued) attributes.
Second-order discrimination works in the
following way. A disvaluee's primary disvalued
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attribute, say, being a male homosexual, causes the
second-order discriminator to view some further
attribute of the disvaluee, say, being an eloquent
speaker, in a negative light. The respect in which this
further attribute is seen as negative depends on the
range of possible descriptions it might satisfy, as well
as the context in which it appears. Thus, for example,
the second-order discriminator might view the
disvaluee's eloquence as purple prose, or empty
rhetoric, or as precious, flowery, or mannered. These
predicates are not interchangeable for the second-order
discriminator. Nor are they taken to be arbitrarily
applied. The second-order discriminator will choose
from among them to express his disvaluation in
response to contingencies of the situation and
individuals involved. The second-order discriminator
may, in all sincerity, explain his disvaluation with
reference to impartially applied aesthetic standards, or
to his ingrown, native suspicion of big words. But
the crucial feature of second-order discrimination is
that the actual explanation for his disvaluing the
person's eloquence, in whatever respect he disvalues
it, is the person's primary disvalued attribute of being
a male homosexual.
Does second-order discrimination as thus
defmed ever actually occur? Some familiar examples
4~- - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
of it include attaching disvalue to a person's having
rhythm, by reason of its putative connection with her
being black; or attaching disvalue to a person's being
very smart, by reason of its putative connection with
his being Jewish. Both of these cases are examples of
discriminatory stereotyping, in which some arbitrary
attribute is falsely taken to be characteristic of persons
of a particular race or ethnic or religious affiliation.
But I mean to call attention to a slightly different
feature of these examples. Someone who practices
second-order discrimination regards a black person
who has rhythm as vulgar, salacious, or offensive; at
the very least, undignified. Similarly, such a person
regards a Jewish person who is very smart as
sophistical, glib, or crafty, or as subversive or
ungentlemanly; at the very least, untrustworthy. In
both cases, attributes that are in themselves salutary,
or at least neutral, are castigated by the second-order
discriminator, by reason of the disvalue conferred on
them by the primary disvalued attribute. This is what
makes them examples of second-order discrimination.
These familiar, stereotypic examples of second-
order discrimination do not exhaust the repertoire of
higher-order discrimination, for many reasons. First,
orders of discrimination can, in theory, be multiplied
indefinitely. So, for example, a case of third-order
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discrimination would involve what I shall call tertiary
disvalued attributes: The primary disvalued attribute
(say, being black) confers disvalue on a further,
secondary disvalued attribute (having rhythm), which
in tum confers disvalue on yet a further attribute of the
person (say, being a good dancer). Having rhythm is
seen as vulgar, by reason of its association with being
black, and being a good dancer is then seen as
exhibitionistic (say), by reason of its association with
having rhythm. In any such case, the primary
attribute is in fact irrelevant to judgments of a person's
value or competence. Hence the value or disvalue it
confers on secondary, tertiary, etc. attributes is
bogus.
The n-order disvalue relation is transitive, in
that, for example, if being black confers disvalue on
having rhythm, and having rhythm confers disvalue
on being a good dancer, then being black confers
disvalue on being a good dancer. The n-order
disvalue relation is also inclusive, in that the primary
disvalued attribute poisons the higher-order
discriminator's evaluations of all further attributes of
the disvaluee. For example, the primary disvalued
attribute of being black may confer disvalue,
alternatively, on a dancer's classical styling: Classical
styling in a black dancer may be seen as inappropriate,
or as an obscene parody of traditional ballet.3 The
primary disvalued attribute also confers disvalue on
other, unrelated attributes of the disvaluee: her
appearance, accent, mode of dress, etc.4
The inclusiveness of the n-order disvalue
relation underscores a second reason why
stereotypical cases of second-order discrimination do
not exhaust the repertoire of higher-order
discrimination: Nonstereotypical traits are also
recruited to receive value or disvalue from primary
attributes to suit particular occasions. We do not
ordinarily think of classical styling in dance as an
attribute about which discriminators might have any
particular attitude. But this may be mistaken. Higher-
order discrimination is not concerned solely with
stereotypical secondary, tertiary, etc. disvalued
attributes. It may be concerned with .l!.DX further
attributes of the person on which the primary
disvalued attribute itself confers disvalue. Thus, for
example, being Jewish (or black, or a woman) may
confer disvalue on being smart, which in turn may
confer disvalue on being intellectually prolific: A
person's intellectual prolificity may be seen as
evidence of logorrhea, or lack of critical conscience,
and may thus poison the evaluation of those
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intellectual products themselves. A first test for
ascertaining whether the disvalue of some attribute of
a person is to be explained as a case of higher-order
discrimination is to ascertain whether or not that
attribute is disvalued uniformly across individuals,
regardless of anything that might count as a primary
disvalued attribute for a higher-order discriminator. If
someone is just as contemptuous of Fred Astaire's
having rhythm as they are of Michael Jackson's, or
just as contemptuous of intellectual prolificity in
Balzac as in Isaac Asimov, then the charge of higher-
order discrimination may be defeated.
Stereotypes change in accordance with
changes in the objects of discrimination, as different
populations seek access to the goods, services and
opportunities enjoyed by the advantaged; and primary
and higher-order disvalued attributes change
accordingly. For instance, the anti-Semitic response
to the attempts of Jewish intellectuals to achieve full
assimilation into the institutions of higher education in
this country frequently found expression in the
disvaluative description of assertively ambitious
Jewish academics as pushy or opportunistic. ow
similarly situated blacks and women frequently enjoy
that title. Conversely, those with such primary
disvalued attributes who attempt to substitute
diplomacy for assertion are characterized by higher-
order discriminators as manipulative, obsequious, or
sycophantic. A second test for ascertaining whether
or not the disvalue of some attribute of a person is to
be explained as a case of higher-order discrimination
is to ascertain whether there is any alternative
attribute, conduct or manner, directed toward the same
goal- i.e. of gaining access to unjustly withheld social
advantages, that avoids or deflects the disvalue
conferred by the primary disvalued attribute. If there
is not - if, that is, whatever your strategy, you're
damned if you do and damned if you don't, then the
charge of higher-order discrimination is prima-facie
justified.
Other arbitrary attributes, not just the familiar
political ones, can function as primary disvalued
attributes to a higher-order discriminator. Physical
appearance, style of diction, social bearing, familial,
educational, or professional pedigree, circle of
associates, manner of dress, are among the more
familiar, if less widely acknowledged, objects of
higher-order discrimination. Some of these attributes
are often assumed to go hand-in-hand with, or even
be partially definitive of, more widely recognized
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -9
primary disvalued attributes. For example, higher-
order discriminators may tend to assume that ethnic
identity is inherently connected with a certain physical
appearance (Jews have dark, curly hair and long
noses), that racial identity is connected with a certain
style of diction and class background (blacks speak
Black English and come from the ghetto), or that
gender identity is connected with a certain social
bearing (women are sympathetic, passive, and
emotional). This is how a stereotype is formed. But
again I mean to call attention to a slightly different
point: These attributes themselves may be seen as
sources of disvalue, independently of their possible
connection with such stereotypically primary
disvalued attributes. Someone who has all of the
valued race, ethnic, religious, class, and gender
attributes, but lacks the valued style of diction, mode
of self-presentation, or educational or professional
pedigrees may be subject to higher-order
discrimination just as fully as someone who lacks all
of the former attributes but has all of the latter. In
both cases, this means that their other attributes - their
personality characteristics, interests, or achievements
- will be seen as higher-order disvalued attributes, by
reason of their association with these equally arbitrary
primary disvalued attributes.
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This shows that the first-order political
discrimination with which we are familiar is merely a
special case of a more general psychological
phenomenon which is not limited to first-order
political discrimination at all. However, higher-order
discrimination usually includes it; for it would be
psychologically unusual, to say the least, to find an
individual who is in general corrupt in his evaluation
of a person's other attributes in the ways just
described, yet impartial and scrupulous in his
evaluations of blacks, Jews, women, gays, etc. and
1illlli: attributes. Someone who is apt to dislike a
person because of her hair texture or accent or mode
of dress can hardly be expected to be genuinely
judicious when it comes to judging her gender, race,
class, sexual orientation, or ethnic or religious
affiliation. Hence we can expect that first-order
political discrimination and higher-order
discrimination in general are to be found together.
Higher-order discrimination as so far
described implies a companion phenomenon, which I
shall call reciprocal hi~her-order discrimination. Here
attributes irrelevant to judgments of a person's
competence or worth are seen as primary valued
attributes, as sources of value which confer value on
the person's secondary, tertiary, etc. attributes. Any
- - ,...,,...,,...,,...,,...,,...,- - ,...,,...,,...,,...,,....,, ..,,...,-11
one of the primary attributes enumerated so far may
have this function. For example, a person's gender
may be perceived as conferring value on secondary
attributes, such as his competence to hold a certain
professional position. Or a person's familial lineage
may be perceive as conferring value on her
admissability to an institution of higher education. Or
a person's class background may be perceived as
conferring value on his manner of dress. Or a
person's educational pedigree may be perceived as
conferring value on her political pronouncements,
which in turn confers value on her personal lifestyle;
and so on. Each of these examples have an arbitrary
and irrational quality to them. That is because
reciprocal higher-order discrimination, like higher-
order discrimination itself, is an arbitrary and
irrational attitude.
Higher-order discrimination and reciprocal
higher-order discrimination are materially
interdependent. If a person's having a particular racial
identity is a source of disvalue for a higher-order
discriminator, then if someone lacks that racial
identity, they are not seen as tainted by that disvalue.
For example, if a person's being oriental confers
disvalue on his attempts at tact, i.e. if he is therefore
perceived as particularly evasive and inscrutable, then
12- ,...,,...,,...,,...,,....,, ...,, ..,,...,,...,,...,,...,,...,,...,,...,,...,,...,-
if he were white, he would not be perceived as
similarly evasive and inscrutable. For if a higher-
order discriminator recognized that one can be just as
evasive and inscrutable without being oriental, say, if
one has a hidden agenda or lacks social skills, then it
would have to be recognized that those attributes,
~ than his being oriental, might be conferring
disvalue on his attempts at tact. Conversely, if a
person's having a particular racial identity is a source
of value for a higher-order discriminator, then
someone who lacks that racial identity is not blessed
by that value. For example, if a person's being white
confers value on his attempts at tact, i.e. if he is
therefore viewed as sensitive and reasonable, then if
he were oriental, he would not be perceived as
similarly sensitive and reasonable. For if a higher-
order discriminator recognized that one can be just as
sensitive and reasonable without being white, say, if
one has no personal investment in the issue or has
thought hard about it, then it would have to be
recognized that those attributes, rather than his being
white, might be conferring value on his attempts at
tact.
The two tests for higher-order discrimination
apply analogously to reciprocal higher-order
discrimination: (1) Ascertain whether or not the higher-
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order valued attribute is valued uniformly across
individuals, regardless of anything that might count as
a primary valued attribute for the discriminator. If a
person's perceived competence to hold a certain
professional position would not be in any way
diminished if she were black - if, that is, blacks with
comparable competence have been hired to such
positions, then the charge of reciprocal higher-order
discrimination may be defeated. (2) Ascertain
whether there is any alternative attribute, conduct or
manner, directed toward the same goal - of gaining
access to some social advantage, that avoids or
deflects the value conferred by the primary valued
attribute. If there is not - if, for example, whether you
are assertively ambitious or carefully diplomatic,
intellectually prolific or intellectually fallow, you can
do no wrong, then the charge of reciprocal higher-
order discrimination is prima facie justified.
Henceforth I shall take higher-order discrimination to
include reciprocal higher-order discrimination. These
two phenomena demonstrate that one need not be a
blatant racist, sexist, snob, anti-Semite, or
homophobe - let us describe such an individual as a
simple first order discriminator - in order to practice
political discrimination. Higher-order discrimination
is given fullest expression indirectly, by implication,
in seemingly unrelated tastes, preferences, and
behavior.
II.
So far I have used locutions like "seen as
conferring value/disvalue on" and "by reason of its
association with" to describe the relation between
primary and higher-order disvalued or valued
attributes, without saying in any detail in what I take
that relation to consist It does JlQt consist in the set of
beliefs held by the higher-order discriminator to the
effect that
(1) (a) agent A has primary disvalued
attribute P;
(b) agent A has n-ary attribute N; and
(c) P confers negative value on ... N.
(1) is faulty because of (c): Only the most perverse
and unrepentant higher-order discriminator would
admit - even to herself - that it is P that confers
negative value on N. On the other hand, only the
most absurdly consistent higher-order discriminator
would affIrm the belief that, in virtue of (1.a) and
(1.b),
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(c') therefore N is of negative value,
period.
This would be the plight of the higher-order
discriminator who, in virtue of his contempt for Isaac
Asimov's intellectual prolificity, would feel compelled
to abjure Balzac as well. Instead, (c) must be replaced
by
(c") N, in the way in which it is borne
by A, is of negative value.
(c") is better because it incorporates that locution that
scrupled higher-order discriminators are so reluctant
or unable to further define: For the higher-order
discriminator, there is just somethin~ about the way in
which a person dances rhythmically that is vulgar;
something about the way in which a person manifests
their intelligence that is glib or sophistical; something
about the way in which they attempt to gain access to
social advantages that is unctuous or opportunisitic.
The higher-order discriminator would vehemently
reject the suggestion that this "something" might have
anything to do with the person's race, gender, class,
sexual orientation, or ethnic or religious affiliation.
But in fact, it is precisely this primary disvalued
attribute from which the blemish spreads. Let us then
take the following set of beliefs
(2) (a) agent A has primary disvalued
attribute P;
(b) agent A has n-ary attribute N; and
(e") N, in the way in which it is borne
by A, is of negative value,
plus the following stipulation
(i) For the higher-order discriminator,
A's possession of P is what in fact
confers negative value on N
as characteristic of the typical, i.e. scrupulous higher-
order discriminator.
What makes higher-order discriminators so
scrupulous? What, that is, explains the higher-order
discriminator's tendency to suppress (2.i)? Part of the
answer lies in the nature of ftrst-order discrimination.
First-order discrimination can be understood as a
species of pseudorationality which relies heavily on
the mechanisms of rationalization and dissociation.5
In rationalization, we apply a concept to something
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too broadly or too narrowly, magnifying the
properties of the thing that instantiate the concept, and
minimizing those properties that fail to do so. The
perception of someone's race, gender, class, sexual
orientation, ethnic or religious affiliation, etc. as a
source of disvalue or value is the consequence of
applying value concepts like "person," "human
being," "citizen," "member of the community,"
"rational and responsible agent," etc. too narrowly, to
include only those individuals who have the primary
valued attribute, and exclude those individuals who
lack it. In dissociation, we identify something in
terms of the negation of the value concepts in
question: Identifying Jews as subhuman, blacks as
childlike, gays as perverts, working- class people as
animals, or women as irrational, for example, are
ways of obscuring one's identification of these
individuals as fully mature, responsible human
beings, and thereby obscuring one's recognition of
these individuals as full members of the community
with which one identifies.6 I submit that these habits
of thought are of the essence of first-order
discrimination.
Higher-order discrimination then adds to this
the pseudorational mechanism of denial, in which we
18- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
suppress recogmtIon of an anomalous thing or
property altogether, in order to preserve the internal
consistency of our beliefs or theory about the world,
ourselves, and other people. I have already argued
that typically, higher-order discriminators are likely to
be fIrst-order discriminators as well; that is, they have
the same prejudices that incline them to view
individuals with the primary disvalued attributes as
inferior, not fully members of their community. The
simple first-order discriminator experiences no
conflict in categorizing disvaluees as inferior beings to
be suppressed and exploited. Therefore, she has no
need to exercise denial, ei ther of her own
discriminatory responses or of the disvaluees'
existence. By contrast, higher-order discriminators
must deny both, in order to preserve the consistency
of their beliefs. Because they are deeply affected, but
not fully reformed, by arguments and experiences that
suggest that discrimination is unjust, both their own
discriminatory responses and the objects of those
responses are anathema to higher-order
discriminators. Because they do not want to believe
that their responses are discriminatory, they deny
them altogether. The higher-order discriminator may
deny, for example, that the primary disvalued attribute
in question is a disvalue at all, and yet helplessly
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deplore the "fact" that nevertheless there are no
competent or worthy candidates bearing this attribute
to be found; or hold any such candidate to a much
higher standard of acceptance or perfonnance than that
he ordinarily applies, relative to which her secondary
attributes can be disparaged. He may denigrate her
intelligence as cleverness; or ridicule her for working
too hard when she exhibits energy and commitment to
her work; or disparage her professional recognition as
achieved through hustling or connections.
These discriminatory responses suggest that
the higher-order discriminator in fact categorizes such
members of the disvalued group themselves in
similarly demeaning terms with respect to their
primary attributes, but experiences a conflict of
conscience about doing so. Faced with the conflict
between first-order discriminatory habits of thought
and the dictates of conscience, the higher-order
discriminator exercises denial, above all in order to
avoid this conflict, by eradicating its source from
awareness. The higher-order discriminator often fails
to acknowledge the very existence or presence of
members of the disvalued groups, in order to
circumvent his own, first-order discriminatory
responses to them.? For instance, he may ignore or
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fail to acknowledge a disvaluee's contribution to a
general discussion, or respond to that contribution as
though someone else had made it. Or he may relegate
a disvaluee to marginal or peripheral tasks in a
professional setting. Or he may simply ignore the
disvaluee altogether, avoiding all social interaction not
strictly required by social or institutional obligations.
In behaving in this fashion, the higher-order
discriminator does not give vent to any sort of
malevolent impulse. His aim is not to insult or injure
the disvaluee in any way. Rather, his aim is to avoid
the painfully conflicting feelings - of disgust or
contempt on the one hand, and the pangs of
conscience on the other - that acknowledgement of the
disvaluee provokes.8
When social or institutional obligations make
denial of the disvaluee's presence impossible, denial
of (at the very least) her primary disvalued attribute,
and of its perceived disvalue, supplies a second-best
resolution to this conflict of conscience: Denial of the
disvaluee's primary disvalued attribute suppresses
from awareness the discriminatory habits of thought
elicited by it, hence similarly preserves consistency,
by placating the requirements of conscience. This is
why the higher-order discriminator tends to suppress
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(2.i). Unfortunately, to suppress habits of thought
from awareness is not to eradicate their influence, any
more than to suppress the disvaluee's existence from
awareness is to eradicate her influence. Higher-order
discrimination is characterized by that attitude in
which a certain habit of thought, namely fIrst-order
discrimination, poisons one's evaluations and
behavior, whether one acknowledges this or not.
The higher-order discriminator is inclined,
moreover, not to acknowledge this, no matter how
obviously incriminating his evaluations and behavior
may be to a disinterested observer. For this would
expose the painful conflict of conscience the higher-
order discriminator's behavior attempts to suppress.
To acknowledge this conflict, in tum, would be to
acknowledge the need to resolve it, i.e. the need to
work through and overcome the fIrst-order prejudices
that gave rise to it. But it is precisely in virtue of
those fIrst-order prejudices themselves that such a
project of self-improvement stands very low on the
higher-order discriminator's list of priorities. Unlike
the resolution of Oedipal conflicts, emotional
problems, tensions in one's personal relationships, or
career dilemmas, coming to terms with one's
prejudices and learning not to inflict them.
inadvertently on others just is not, in the last analysis,
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seen as terribly important by the higher-order
discriminator. That is part of what makes him a
disriminator in the fIrst place.9
As I have painted it, then, higher-order
discrimination is peculiarly the sickness of thoughtful,
well-intentioned and conscientious individuals who
nevertheless have failed adequately to confront and
work through their own prejudices, or who perhaps
have been too quickly satisfied by their ability to
marshall arguments on behalf of doing so. Such
individuals are being neither disingenuous nor
hypocritical when they deny that a person's race,
gender, class, sexual orientation, or ethnic or religious
affiliation affects their judgment of her competence or
worth. They vehemently insist that this is so, they
want it to be so, and they genuinely believe it to be so.
They are, nevertheless, mistaken. Their efforts to
explain away each manifest expression of higher-
order discrimination on different and inconsistent
grounds are unconvincing. And their behavior
exhibits a degree of otherwise inexplicable
arbitrariness and idiosyncracy that severely strains our
attempts to apply the principle of charity in making
sense of it. Hence in order to understand the behavior
of higher-order discriminators, we must watch what
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -23
they QQ, not what they m.1O
For example, these attitudes may find
expression in an expectation of greater deference or
genuflection from a member of the disvalued group.
The simple first-order discriminator expresses his
anger at the violation of this expectation in certain
familiar stereotypes: the "uppity nigger" whose refusal
to behave subserviently is seen as impudence or
disrespect; or the "Jewish-American Princess," whose
assertiveness, presumption of self-worth, and
expectation of attention and respect are seen as a sign
of being spoiled, selfish, or imperious. But for the
higher-order discriminator, such anger is displaced
into more subtle but similar reactions: Such an
individual may just feel angered or personally
affronted by a woman's presumption of equality - in
personal, social, or intellectual status, or professional
worth, or as a competitor for social or professional
rewards; or unduly irritated by her failure to defer or
back down in argument. She may be viewed as
forward in conversation, when in fact she contributes
no more and no less than anyone else; or stubborn,
unresponsive, or impervious to well-intentioned
criticism, when in fact the only acceptable response to
those criticisms, in the eyes of the higher-order
discriminator, would be for her to concur with them
wholeheartedly and apologize for her dereliction. Or,
to take another example, the higher-order
discriminator may feel invaded or compromised by a
black person's jocularity or willingness to trade
friendly insults that one accepts as a matter of course
from those considered to be one's peers. The black
person may be viewed as overly familiar, insolent, or
presumptuous. In all such cases, the disvaluee's
behavior is seen as a presumption, not a right or an
accepted practice.!! The higher-order discriminator is
tortured by the suspicion that he is somehow being
ridiculed, or shown insufficient respect, or that the
disvaluee's conduct bespeaks contempt.
In a recent compelling analysis of anger,12
N.J.H. Dent suggests that anger is based ultimately
on feelings of personal inferiority: These lead one to
overestimate the importance of others' expressions of
regard and esteem for one, which in turn multiplies
the number of occasions upon which one feels
slighted or demeaned when such expressions are not
forthcoming, or of insufficient magnitude relative to
one's importunate requirements. This oversensitivity
to being slighted in turn provokes in one the desire to
rectify one's situation through retaliation, by lashing
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out at the offender. This analysis by itself does not, I
think, cover all cases of anger; nor does it explain the
origins of simple fIrst-order discrimination. But it
does provide insight into why higher-order
discriminators, like simple fIrst-order discriminators,
are apt to become so angry, so often, at imagined
slights from seemingly arrogant disvaluees. The more
inferior one feels, the more expressions of esteem one
requires. And the more inferior one perceives a
disvaluee to be, the more elaborate the disvaluee's
expression of esteem of one is required to be.
Whereas a friendly nod from a perceived superior is
suffIcient to transport one to a state of grace, anything
less than a full-length obeisance from a perceived
inferior appears to be an insult.13 In all such cases,
irascibility regularly directed at particular members of
disvalued groups should not be dismissed as simply
an idiosyncrasy of character, even if it is not
intentionally directed at members of disvalued groups
as such. It is, nevertheless, an overt expression of
higher-order discrimination.
A second, related example of behavior and
judgments distorted by higher-order discrimination is
the treatment of disvaluees in a way that would
constitute a clear insult or faux pas, if the person so
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treated were one of one's recognized peers. For
example, a white Gentile may privately make an anti-
Semitic remark to a black colleague, in a misguided
effort to establish rapport, when such a remark would
be seen as a serious social lapse even among other
white Gentiles. Or a heterosexual may make
gratuitous disparaging remarks to a gay colleague
about her work or job performance, of a sort designed
to "cut her down to size" rather than provide
constructive criticism. Or a man may make
offensively personal remarks to a woman colleague
about her physical appearance, personal life, or
manner of dress, of a sort that would be highly
inappropriate if they were made to another man. Or
he might expect from a woman colleague extra
forbearance for fits of temper, irresponsible conduct,
or extraordinary professional demands that he would
not from a man. The higher-order discriminator, in
other social contexts, may be acclaimed quite rightly
as a " prince among men"; to disvaluees, however, he
reveals himself as Mr. Hyde.l4 Yet unlike former
President Lyndon Johnson, who conferred with his
cabinet through an open bathroom door, while
uninhibitedly and indiscreetly performing his morning
ablutions, the higher-order discriminator cannot be
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supposed to commit these boorish excesses with any
offensive intent. Rather, he regards his response to
person's disvalued attributes as socially innocuous; as
an acceptable variation in social etiquette, keyed to the
variations among the personality traits of different
individuals.
A third example of such distorted behavior is
the implicit treatment of disvaluees as being obligated
by different rules of conduct than those which govern
oneself and those considered to be one's peers. One
may apply different criteria of interpretation to the
behavior of disvaluees: Whereas enigmatic behavior
by valuees is excused, overlooked, or given the
benefit of the doubt, similar behavior on the part of
disvaluees is interpreted as proof of vice or
malevolence. This interpretation motivates the higher-
order discriminator not only to avoid, but also to
justify the avoidance of direct interaction with the
disvaluee, and thus avoid the conflict of conscience
described earlier. Or one may apply rules of honor,
loyalty, and responsiblity only to those considered to
be one's peers, but may have no scruples about
betraying the trust or confidentiality of a disvaluee,
who is implicitly viewed as unentitled to such
consideration. Alternately, one may hold disvaluees
to far more stringent moral standards than the
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members of one's own community in fact practice
among themselves. Any violation of these standards
by the disvaluee then creates an irradicable moral
blemish to which the valuees are invulnerable, by
reason of their status as valuees. These cases express
quite clearly the conviction that disvaluees just do not
have quite that same status, hence are not to be subject
to the same standards of treatment, as members of
one's recognized community - at the same time that
the higher-order discriminator vehemently and in all
honesty denies that any such discrimination is taking
place. Indeed in all of these examples, the higher-
order discriminator may sincerely deny that the
person's race, gender, class, sexual orientation, ethnic
or religious affiliation, etc. arbitrarily influences his
evaluations, when his behavior shows patently that
they do.
III.
There are many forces that may intensify
higher-order discrimination and its social
consequences. Among them are, fIrst and foremost,
complicitous institutional practices. Individuals in
positions of responsibility often rank their personal
and social allegiances ahead of their professional
obligation to protect disvaluees from the pernicious
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effects of higher-order discrimination. Or they
effectively reward higher-order discrimination, by
regularly interpreting instances of it as expressions of
professional autonomy, and refusing in principle to
scrutinize suspected instances of it, on the grounds
that doing so would be unwarranted interference in an
organization's internal affairs. These institutions
often comply with the letter of antidiscriminatory
policies, by hiring members of disvalued groups to
temporary positions of high public visibility. Since
such individuals are regularly replaced by other,
equally competent but equally transient members of
the same disvalued group, that group's visibility
within the institution can be maintained, without
infiltrating the entrenched system of discrimination
through permanent or seniority status. This is to
abdicate the responsibility for enforcing those
antidiscriminatory policies to which such institutions
publicly claim to be committed.
Second, there is the intellectual
resourcefulness of the higher-order discriminator:
Someone who is in fact deeply invested in the
disvaluational status of some primary attribute may
always recruit some further, equally irrelevant
attribute to explain her seemingly irrational judgment,
and thus deflect the charge of higher-order
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discrimination: It may be said, for example, that the
disvalued attribute is not a person's race, gender,
class, sexual orientation, ethnic or religious affiliation,
etc., but rather his inability to "fit in," to "get along
with others," or "be a team player." This is a
particularly familiar and dependable response, because
the evidence for ascribing this attribute may be
materially coextensive with the evidence for
disvaluing the primary attribute at issue: Since the
disvaluee is in theory held to the same standards of
conduct that govern others in the community, but in
fact expected to conform to different ones, tailored to
his disvalued status, his inability to "fit in" can be
guaranteed at the outset 15
A third force that intensifies higher-order
discrimination are the repressive, pseudorational
habits of rationalization, dissociation, and denial
already discussed. Earlier I suggested that higher
-order discriminators were generally well-intentioned
individuals who had failed to come to terms with their
own prejudices. I also mentioned some possible
reasons for this failure: avoidance of conflicts of
conscience, feelings of personal inferiority, and first
-order discrimination among them. Another reason
that should not be neglected is that higher-order
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discriminators tend to rationalize, dissociate, or deny
the very existence of higher-order discrimination
itself. They might claim, for example, that the
phenomenon I have described is in truth simple
sensitivity to subtle variations and qualities among
individuals, all of which might be relevant to
questions of value or competence in a sufficiently
broad sense. Or they might agree that higher-order
discrimination exists, but dissociate it from their own
motives and behavior, as an anomalous phenomenon
that is too rare to merit further scrutiny. Or they might
just flatly deny the existence of anything like what I
have described as higher-order discrimination, and
deny as well the undeniably familiar instances of it
which I have invoked to anchor the foregoing
analysis. These tactics reinforce the tendencies of
higher-order discriminators to deny their own
collusion in the practice of higher-order
discrimination, and to deny or minimize their need to
come to terms with it. Higher-order discriminators
are adept at the tactics of pseudorationality because
they have so much self-esteem to lose by modifying
their beliefs. But ~ must not be taken in. For above
all, higher-order discriminators need to understand
that no one is fooled by their tactics. With the aid of
this understanding, they may someday learn to stop
fooling themselves.
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Footnotes
1This paper is excerpted from Chapter xn. of
a longer discussion, Rationality and the Structure of
the Self, work on which was supported by an Andrew
Mellon Postdoctoral Fellowship at Stanford
University and a Woodrow Wilson International
Fellowship. Earlier versions were delivered to the
Philosophy Department at George Washington
University, the Kennedy Institute of Ethics of
Georgetown University, Howard University, the
University of Mississippi, the City College of New
York, the University of Maryland, the Boston Area
Conference on Character and Morality hosted by
Radcliffe and Wellesley Colleges (Nancy Sherman
commenting), the Feminism and Racism Symposium
at the Eastern Division American Philosophical
Association Convention, Franklin and Marshall
College, Williams College, Western Michigan
University, and Brown University's Conference on
Ethics and Racism. I have benefitted from these
discussions. Laurence Thomas provided extensive
comments on an earlier draft.
2Thus I shall not be considering cases in
which race, gender, etc. ~ relevant to judgments of a
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person's value or competence, e.g. as a role model in
a classroom, or to provide a unique and needed
perspective in a business venture or court of law. I
restrict the discussion to consideration of intrinsic
value or competence as determined by principles of
justice and equality. The contrast is with instrumental
value or competence in furthering some specified
social or institutional policy, of the sort that would
figure in arguments that would justify, e.g., refusing
to sell real estate in a certain neighborhood to a black
family solely because doing so would lower property
values, or hiring a woman to a professional position
solely in order to meet affmnative action quotas, or
refusing to serve Asians at one's family diner solely
because it would be bad for business. Whether these
should be included under the rubric of first-order
discrimination, hypocrisy, prudence, or mere moral
pusillanimity is too large a topic to address here.
30f course there are other, more convoluted
cases of higher-order discrimination that represent
epicyclic variations on the straightforward cases I
shall be examining. For example, being black may
wildly exaggerate the value attached to classical
styling in a black dancer, if classical styling is
perceived as something the person had to overcome
great innate and cultural obstacles to achieve. In either
case, being black functions as a primary disvalued
attribute because it carries a presumption of inferiority
into the evaluation of further attributes of the person.
4 Is it perhaps too strong to claim that a
primary disvalued attribute poisons the higher-order
discriminator's evaluation of all of the disvaluee's
other attributes? Can't a higher-order discriminator
respect a disvaluee's traits of character in a certain
restricted area, despite his disvalued status? I am
inclined to think not. For this seems to occur almost
exclusively when the "valued" attribute itself
conforms to the higher-order discriminator's
stereotypes. For example, a black man may be
admired for his athletic prowess but encounter
hostility when he runs for political office. In such
cases, the higher-order discriminator's admiration and
respect for the stereotypical trait is not unalloyed. It is
tempered by a certain smug complacency at the
disvaluee's confmnation of his disvalued status in the
very cultivation and expression of that stereotypical
trait. To sustain the above objection, we would need
to see a higher-order discriminator exhibiting
unalloyed admiration and respect for nonstereotypical
traits, such that these positive feelings did not. in turn.
positively reform the higher-order discriminator's
prejudicial attitude toward the person's primary
disvalued attribute: Someone who sincerely respects
and admires a disvaluee for non stereotypical reasons,
without feeling threatened or invaded, has already
begun to weaken the psychological edifice on which
her discriminatory evaluation of the person as a
disvaluee is based.
51 discuss the concepts of pseudorationality,
rationalization, dissociation, and denial at greater
length in "Two Conceptions of the Self,"
Philosophical Studies 48, 2 (September 1985), 173-
197; reprinted in The Philosopher's Annual VIII
(1985), and "Pseudorationality," in Brian McLaughlin
and Amelie o. Rorty, Eds., Perspectives on Self-
Deception (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1988).
In characterizing first-order discrimination in
terms of rationalization and dissociation, I mean to
describe the actual behavior of simple first-order
discriminators. If it is true, as some have suggested,
that first-order discrimination is symptomatic of a
repressed attraction to a disvalued attribute, or fear
that one has it (e.g. blacks' uninhibitedness, women's
sensitivity), then the explanation of first-order
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discrimination may invoke denial as well.
6The irony in the case of racism is that there is
a substantial literature in biology and the social
sciences that indicates that almost all purportedly
white Americans have between five and twenty
percent black ancestry - hence are, according to this
country's entrenched "just one trace" convention of
racial classification, black. See Joel Williamson, A
New People (New York: Free Press, 1974); L.L.
Cavalli-Sforza and W.F. Bodmer, The Genetics of
Human Populations (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman
and Co., 1971), pp. 490-499; T.E. Reed, "Caucasian
Genes in American Negroes," Science 165 (1969),
762-768; P.L. Workman, B.S. Blumberg and A.J.
Cooper, "Selection, Gene Migration and Polymorphic
Stability in a U.S. White and Negro Population,"
American Journal of Human Genetics 15, 4 (1963),
429-437; Bentley Glass and C.C. Li, "The Dynamics
of Racial Admixture - An Analysis of the American
Negro," American Journal of Human Genetics 5
(1953), 1-20. For these references and discussion on
this matter I am indebted to Professor Monro S.
Edmonson of Tulane University's Department of
Anthropology.
7This may contribute to an explanation of the
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phenomenon, noted by Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo
(Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and
Interpretations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1985), that in the last twenty years,
white support for the principles of equality and
fairness for blacks have increased, concurrently with
white opposition to the implemenation of those
principles.
8Denial of a person's presence as a way of
avoiding conflicting feelings about them is fairly
common. A very handsome man may be the object of
denial, when others' feelings of attraction to him
conflict with their conviction that these feelings are
inappropriate; a very fortunate or charismatic person
may be the object of denial, when other's feelings of
envy or resentment conflict with a similar conviction.
Or a homely person may be the object of denial when
other's feelings of repugnance conflict with their
kindness or social good will. Higher-order
discrimination is most analogous to this last-described
case.
9Here I think it would be wrong to interpret
the higher-order discriminator as concerned with
personal problems and not with social ones. Rather,
the higher-order discriminator belittles the importance
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of addressing a certain personal problem.
1DOne implication of characterizing higher-
order discrimination as a sickness rather than a fault is
that higher-order discriminators are, in the last
analysis, not morally responsible for their behavior.
This conclusion seems unpalatable in many respects.
Nevertheless, I am reluctantly pessimistic about the
efficacy of appeals to reason in higher-order
discriminators. Because their reason - or rather, their
dogged pseudorationality - is so inherently a part of
the problem, I am inclined to think that the solution
should be sought in the adoption of some version of
Strawson's "objective attitude" toward them; i.e. that
higher-order discriminators must be managed -
perhaps psychotherapeutically - rather than addressed.
I suggest an explanation for this kind of intractability
in "Two Conceptions of the Self" and
"Pseudorationality," op. cit. Note 5.
11The view of the disvaluee's assumption of
equality as a msumption may explain the higher-
order discriminator's otherwise inexplicable umbrage
at being complemented by a disvaluee: An inferior is
in no position to confer favors of any kind.
12N.J.H. Dent, The Moral Psycholo~y of the
Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1984), 155-160.
l3In the deep South up to the mid-1960s, for
example, for a black person to meet the gaze of a
white person was perceived as an offense; and for a
black man even to look at a white woman was to
. invite lynching.
14This often creates additional difficulties in
identitfying cases of higher-order discrimination for
what they are. The testimony of a disvaluee suffers a
credibility problem at the outset. This problem is
severely exascerbated if the testimony concerns a
higher-order discriminator whom others have every
reason to regard as a saint. Under these
circumstances, any charge of inconsistency - whether
it comes from others and targets the disvaluee, or
comes from the disvaluee and targets the higher-order
discriminator - is in the eye of the beholder. For
higher-order discriminators regard coarse, tasteless,
or brutal behavior toward disvaluees as called forth by
them and so warranted; hence as fully consistent with
the most highly refined manners and courtly civility
toward others.
15Under these circumstances, the disvaluee,
too, may be accused rightly of pseudorationality, if
his personal investment in the theoretical standards of
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equal treatment is so great that he rationalizes,
dissociates, or denies the facts of discrimination that
blatantly confront him. But I argue elsewhere ("The
Meaning of 'Ought' and the Loss of Innocence",
unpublished paper, 1989) that self-preservation
reQuires that, although such ideals ultimately must die,
they must not do so without a long and painful
struggle. The concept of personal investment is
discussed at greater length in "Moral Theory and
Moral Alienation," The Journal of Philosophy
LXXXIV, 2 (February 1987), 102-118.
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